Sparta and the English Republic by Foxley, Rachel
Sparta and the English Republic 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Foxley, R. (2016) Sparta and the English Republic. Classical 
Receptions Journal, 8 (1). pp. 54­70. ISSN 1759­5142 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/crj/clv015 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/44454/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://crj.oxfordjournals.org/ 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/crj/clv015 
Publisher: Oxford University Press 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
Sparta and the English Republic 
Rachel Foxley, Department of History, University of Reading 
 
In 1659-60, as England teetered on the brink of political collapse in the series of events 
which (as it turned out) was to lead to the restoration of Charles II to the throne, two 
republican authors were engaged in a bitter dispute about ancient Sparta. Although both 
authors took pains to establish their scholarly credibility – with differing levels of 
success – their battle was primarily political, part of a fervent and urgent debate among 
republicans about how a viable commonwealth might yet be established on the ruins of 
the interregnum’s constitutional experiments and in time to halt a slide towards 
monarchy. The authors in question were James Harrington, the author of the republican 
masterpiece of the interregnum, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), and Henry 
Stubbe, a promising young academic and a protégé of the ‘godly republican’ Sir Henry 
Vane. The classical Greek focus of their dispute sheds light on the nature of English 
republican thought, the interplay of classical and scholarly authority with pamphlet 
debate and political argument, and the malleability of the Greek legacy for early modern 
readers. The classical offered a route through which political ‘innovation’, suspect as 
that always was in early modern England, could be legitimized. But while the rich and 
sometimes contradictory evidence of ancient texts could be brought to bear in multiple 
ways, some consensus positions developed in the early modern scholarship posed fairly 
effective limits to the claims it was possible to make. 
Both Harrington and Stubbe were writing in the context of a classical republican 
tradition (with origins in Italian humanism) which had been overtly and energetically 
adapted for English audiences by multiple authors only in the wake of the execution of 
Charles I in 1649 (Pocock 1975: 357-60, 372; Worden 1990: 225-6). The educated were 
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schooled in classical texts and arguments about liberty and tyranny, and when the new 
republic required such arguments, several authors demonstrated their familiarity with 
Machiavelli and other continental authors, but the extent of any classical republican cast 
to English political thought before 1649 remains much disputed (Peltonen 1995; 
Sommerville 2007). Classical texts formed a reservoir of political wisdom drawn on by 
authors across the political spectrum and sometimes plundered for messages whose 
piety and triteness could barely align them with any definite political philosophy; 
conversely, the radical political thought of the 1640s Levellers was not couched in 
classical terms. The adoption of classical republican discourse in England coincided 
with political crisis and constitutional experimentation, with the political influence of 
puritan religiosity, and with the impact of different, de facto and Hobbesian, theories of 
political authority. The reception of classical constitutional ideas in this period was thus 
only partly shaped by existing traditions of Italian civic humanism or classical 
republicanism; a multitude of other circumstances and intellectual influences influenced 
authors’ readings of ancient politics. In Harrington and Stubbe we will see two authors 
experimenting with the boundaries of classical constitutional vocabulary as they shaped 
a political tradition for English circumstances. 
Republican writers played an ambivalent role in a kingless England from 1649 to 
1660, defending republican principles but often critiquing – whether overtly or covertly 
– the realities of rule first by the purged Rump Parliament and then by Oliver Cromwell 
as Lord Protector. When Cromwell died in 1658 and his son Richard succeeded him as 
Lord Protector, criticism burst into the open as republicans saw a chance to rescue the 
‘good old cause’ and establish a true republic. Richard Cromwell was swiftly eased 
from power and the Rump parliament returned in the spring of 1659 amid a clamour of 
competing republican and army proposals for a longer-term settlement – among them, 
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Harringtonian proposals and examples of ‘theocratic republicanism’ which were very 
much at odds with each other (Mayers 2004: 213-228). Classical republican thought 
since 1649 had taken many forms, with authors drawing on different aspects of a 
complex tradition: some, such as Milton, emphasized the republican ethic which linked 
virtue, reason, and liberty, but had little to say about constitutional forms; others, such 
as Marchamont Nedham, had drawn on Machiavelli’s emphasis on the glory and 
expansion of Rome in its republican period to urge the superiority of a ‘free state’ over a 
monarchy. Few, apart from Harrington, offered detailed constitutional prescriptions. It 
is significant that the dispute over constitutional forms and terms examined in this paper 
took place in 1659-60, as this was the moment when republicans who had previously 
been content to commend the embrace of liberty in classical (and godly) republican 
terms faced up to the need to find institutions which could secure that liberty against 
imminent political collapse and monarchical restoration. The need to save the 
commonwealth led to definitional disputes about the constitutions which might qualify 
as ‘commonwealths’, and pamphleteers drew inspiration from constitutional features of 
the ancient republics in their search for mechanisms, whether permanent or temporary, 
which could safeguard liberty. Harrington and Stubbe’s dispute about Sparta was part of 
a broader dispute about what kind of additional assembly or council might be needed 
alongside a popular House (in practice the restored Rump parliament of 1659) to secure 
liberty, and that in turn was framed by Harrington’s strictures on the kind of constitution 
which could really be accounted a commonwealth.  
Harrington and Stubbe were both drawn to ancient Sparta as a model for an 
English commonwealth. Distinguished work by Elizabeth Rawson and Anna Strumia 
has already examined the treatment of Sparta by Harrington and his antagonists in the 
1650s, pinning down the divergent interpretations of Spartan history and institutions 
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reached by Harrington and by his royalist opponents Matthew Wren and Peter Heylyn, 
and his republican sparring partner Stubbe (Rawson 1969: 191-196; Strumia 1991: ix-
xvii; 48-53; 93-109). Both scholars emphasize the importance of Sparta, certainly as 
compared with Athens, to Harrington and Stubbe’s republican thought, Rawson 
pointing to Sparta as the equal of Rome in Harrington’s work, if inferior to the 
immortality of Venice (1969: 191-3), and Strumia pointing to Israel and Sparta as 
appealingly aristocratic models for republicans who disparaged the tumultuous popular 
politics of Athens (1991: xvi). These comparisons between Athens and Sparta, and 
between ancient and modern republics, had roots in Italian republican thought. 
Machiavelli had praised Lycurgus for establishing a mixed constitution, which 
(according to the Polybian theory) had ensured Sparta’s remarkable longevity, 
compared to the instability of Solon’s democracy (‘stato popolare’) at Athens. However, 
Sparta, for Machiavelli, was a republic capable of maintaining itself but not expanding, 
and he preferred Rome, even with its tumults (Machiavelli 2000: 14, 22 – Discorsi 1.2, 
1.6); the Spartan model appealed more to Italian admirers of Venice (although it could 
pale in comparison: Kraye 1997: 131, 137; Rawson 1969: 154-5) who prized La 
Serenissima’s apparent lack of social conflict. On one level, Harrington and Stubbe both 
fitted the model of ‘aristocratic’ republicans, far from the populism of the Levellers in 
the 1640s or of rare populist republicans like Marchamont Nedham or John Streater 
after 1649 (Foxley 2013b: 194-229). Harrington’s political model assumed the existence 
of a ‘natural aristocracy’ and gave the rest of the citizenry a carefully circumscribed 
political role not involving political debate. Stubbe and his patron Sir Henry Vane the 
younger promoted republican models which would entrust the political direction of the 
country (at least in the immediate term) only to those who were committed to the godly-
republican cause. On the face of it, then, it is particularly odd that, while both praising 
5 
 
Sparta as a model, they both veered away from describing her simply as an 
‘aristocracy’, or as a commonwealth exemplifying the virtues of a mixed polity, and 
redefined her as a ‘democracy’ or an ‘oligarchy’ in polemical ways which led them into 
dispute with each other. In this article I will argue that a series of Harrington’s 
commitments – to popular sovereignty, however carefully its practice was 
circumscribed; to a Bodinian description of the form of government according to the 
single location of sovereignty; to the relationship between landholding and political 
form; to the possibility of an immortal commonwealth; and to ‘ancient prudence’ as the 
basis for politics – led him away from the scholarly consensus that Sparta was an 
aristocracy towards the idea that she was a democracy. Conversely, Stubbe’s positive 
commitment to restrictive citizenship and a hand-picked senate, designed to secure 
England against the return of monarchy, meant that he first embraced the consensus that 
Sparta was an aristocracy, and then (once his position was attacked as oligarchical by 
Harrington) went further and reclaimed the label ‘oligarchy’ both for Sparta and for 
England. This article will flesh out what was at stake in this dispute and the ways in 
which layers of sources interacted with polemical exigencies to generate both authors’ 
controversial claims. 
 
‘Ancient prudence’ 
 
Harrington published his elaborate scheme for a reformed commonwealth, The 
Commonwealth of Oceana, in 1656, at a troubled moment during Oliver Cromwell’s 
protectorate. His professed aim in Oceana was to recover ‘ancient prudence’, the 
political wisdom which underpinned the classical republics of Greece and Rome and the 
biblical republic of Israel. In his view, only Machiavelli among the moderns had 
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attempted to recover this, while others had all fallen prey to the amoral principles of 
‘modern prudence’ which justified reason of state and the dominance of monarchies 
(Harrington 1977: 161-3). This emphasis on the classical past was carried over into the 
fictional narrative of Oceana, in which the Council of Legislators which was to draw up 
the orders for the new commonwealth of Oceana ‘ransacked’ the ‘archives of ancient 
prudence’ by allotting particular ancient (but also a few modern) commonwealths to 
individual councillors to study and report on. First on this list of commonwealths were 
Israel, Athens, and Lacedaemon (Harrington 1977: 208). Readers have, however, 
doubted the centrality of classical thought and example to Harrington. Although for 
J.G.A. Pocock Harrington was a key figure in a genuinely classical republican tradition, 
and more recently Eric Nelson has emphasized classical Greek thinking as an element 
of Harrington’s thought, other modern scholars have frequently seen Harrington’s 
vaunted allegiance to ‘ancient’ prudence as masking a thoroughly modern mode of 
thought, as much influenced by Hobbes and by distinctly modern elements of 
Machiavellianism as by the ancients (Pocock in Harrington 1977: 15; Pocock 1975: 
384-395; Nelson 2004: 87-125; Scott 1993; Rahe 1994: vol 2, 179-96; Rahe 2008: 321-
346). Certainly, ancient prudence itself was malleable, and Harrington’s ancient 
prudence was very much his own creation: he equated ‘ancient prudence’ with 
republican government (1977: 397) and thus read the contemporary Dutch, Swiss and 
Venetian republics alongside the genuinely ancient material. It was certainly possible to 
suggest that the ancients did not offer a suitable guide for the present - Stubbe himself 
did so – but within the classicizing discourse of his dispute with Harrington he had to 
call on Aristotle’s authority even to do this (Stubbe 1659b: 8). But while classical 
philosophy and the example of the ancients were clearly far from the only or even main 
determinants of either Harrington or Stubbe’s proposals for England, they constituted a 
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crucial matrix of material through which these proposals were thought out, tested, and 
presented. 
Harrington’s dispute with Stubbe was rather asymmetrical. Stubbe was noted for 
his brilliance in Greek while an undergraduate, and by the time of their dispute held a 
Studentship at Christ Church, Oxford and was under-keeper of the Bodleian library, 
enjoying the patronage of John Owen, the Vice-Chancellor of the University and Dean 
of Christ Church. Harrington’s spell at Trinity College, Oxford, by contrast, did not 
result in a degree, and although this was not unusual at the time, he showed that it 
rankled when   he suggested that he could ‘legitimately’ complete the ‘exercises’ 
necessary to attain Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctor’s degrees simply by defeating his 
opponents with a series of unanswerable arguments in a pamphlet (Jacob 1983: 9-10; 
18-19; Harrington 1977: 2, 706). Stubbe found this risible, and in the polemical back-
and-forth between the authors he accused Harrington of ‘trading with Compendiums’ 
rather than returning to the sources in the original (1660: 6, 13). Nonetheless, 
Harrington was working from Latin sources rather than English translations of the 
classics, and the main compendium which he mined for information on Sparta was an 
authoritative work also used by Stubbe: the Danish scholar Nicolaus Cragius’ De 
Republica Lacedaemoniorum Libri IIII (1593), treated by early modern readers as the 
counterpart of the eminent Sigonius’ treatise on Athens (Harrington 1656: 56; Emmius 
1632: 5-6, and cf. reader’s inscription of Emmius passage on British Library copy of 
Cragius 1593, shelfmark 586.d.20.(1.)).  
With Cragius, Harrington and Stubbe were dealing with an author whose work 
had little overt ‘spin’. Cragius (Niels Krag, a diplomat, scholar, and Danish 
historiographer royal) naturally did not present Sparta as a republican alternative to 
monarchy. His dedicatory letter to the Danish chancellor painted Sparta as the most 
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illustrious of the ancient republics, as evidenced by the virtue of its citizens. Although 
Cragius emphasized that such virtue was a product of institutions, his letter 
uncontroversially pointed to education and respect for the laws as routes to this virtue 
(1593: 2r-4r). Within his text, Cragius avoided drawing overt lessons almost entirely, 
except for a remarkable outburst lamenting the fact that even learned men and those 
with political experience now advocated absolute power and license for kings, rather 
than the strict subordination of the kings to the law seen in Sparta (1593: 57). While 
strongly worded, this was hardly an avowal of republicanism, although it certainly 
chimes with Harrington’s insistence on the rule of laws rather than men as one of the 
key principles of ‘ancient prudence’, and with his contempt for the apparent 
systematization of self-interested principles in ‘modern prudence’ (Harrington 1977: 
161). More subtly, Cragius displayed a tendency - reflecting broader assumptions in this 
period – to denigrate ‘democracy’, translating ‘δημοκρατίαν’ as ‘plebis dominatio’ 
rather than simply as ‘democratia’ or a more usual Latin equivalent such as ‘popularis 
status’ (1593: 70). All in all, Cragius appears studiedly moderate, keen to avoid the 
tyranny of either kings or people, and his scholarly judgements on the question of 
Sparta’s constitutional form were also uncontroversial. What Cragius did, however, was 
to provide a collection of testimonies from the ancient world, and his own 
interpretations, which Harrington and Stubbe then read in the light of their polemical 
needs, their preferred ancient sources (whether in the original or in some kind of 
translation), and of more modern political thought, such as that of Bodin. 
 
Harrington and Sparta 
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Sparta took on a particular significance as a support for several aspects of Harrington’s 
thinking. Fundamental to his theory was the need for a government to be founded on the 
appropriate balance of landed property. Where the majority of land was in the hands of 
the people, the government had to be a commonwealth if it was to be stable (and, in 
Harrington’s view, this was now the state of affairs in England). Any government 
hoping to have a ‘long lease’ needed an ‘agrarian’ – a ‘law fixing the balance in lands’ - 
to make sure that the pattern of land-holding did not once more shift and fatally 
undermine the political regime based on it (Harrington 1977: 164). Ancient precedents 
were crucial – and as Harrington’s critics were not above remarking, ‘examples of an 
agrarian are so infrequent, that Mr Harrington is constrained to waive all but two 
commonwealths, and can find in the whole extent of history only Israel and 
Lacedaemon to fasten upon’ (Harrington 1977: 460). Sparta’s famed longevity as a 
republic could thus be explained by its apparent adherence to strict rules enforcing the 
equal allocation of property among the Spartiates, while the troubles of the Roman 
republic were inevitable given the failure of the Gracchi (Harrington 1977: 184, 277). 
As Rawson remarks, Harrington’s focus on the landed basis of politics prompted him to 
offer an unprecedently full, if idiosyncratic, portrait of Sparta, and led to debates with 
his opponents which were ‘the first time since Agis and Cleomenes that the Lycurgan 
land system has been a matter of even half-practical discussion’ (1969: 191,194).  
Harrington’s theory of the property balance was intrinsically linked to his thinking 
on constitutional form, and it is this aspect of the struggle over Sparta which I will 
concentrate on here. The ancient sources furnished a basic repertoire of simple and 
mixed constitutional forms which had long functioned as a structuring feature of 
political thinking, and the vocabulary of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (and 
their degenerate forms) had been adopted both in translated forms via Latin and, still 
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with a hint of intellectual pretentiousness in some contexts, as Greek loan-words 
(Harrington 1977: 162; 785). Early modern thinkers, however, challenged the common 
assumptions which underlay these classifications as discussed in the ancient authors in 
two ways: absolutists by contesting the possibility or desirability of mixed government, 
and republicans by challenging the idea that the three undegenerate simple forms of 
government were equally valid governments, suitable to different circumstances, in 
favour of a more rigid ‘republican exclusivism’ which rejected monarchy (Nelson 2007; 
Wootton 2006: 272-96; Hankins, 2010). Harrington, in typically ambitious and 
ambiguous style, managed to participate in both these developments while still invoking 
the classical notions of mixed government and constitutional variation correlated to 
circumstances.  
As I have argued elsewhere, Harrington committed himself to an idiosyncratic 
version of ‘republican exclusivism’ in insisting that nothing could be regarded as a 
commonwealth (or an equal commonwealth) unless it was a popular government or 
democracy (Foxley 2013a: 180-181, 183). While monarchy would be the legitimate 
form of government if the corresponding property balance were in place, it would never, 
according to Harrington, reach the perfection of government that an equal 
commonwealth would ensure: ultimately, then, democracy was the best form of 
government. Harrington’s insistence on this exclusive democratic definition of 
republicanism was a crucial shibboleth dividing him from Vane and Stubbe in 1659-60 
(Dzelzainis 2014). Sparta was inevitably drawn into Harrington’s appropriation of 
‘democracy’, and into his dispute with Stubbe. For a start, Sparta was a key example of 
stability resulting from the ‘balance’ of land tallying with the political regime. But there 
was no doubt in Harrington’s mind that the land balance instituted by Lycurgus at 
Sparta (like Moses’ in Israel) was ‘democratical or popular’ (1977: 459). This could 
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hardly be doubted by a reader of Cragius, whose cautious discussion of contradictory 
evidence in the earlier parts of his discussion of Sparta gave way, in Book 3, to a much 
more decisive reconstruction of the tables of Spartan ‘instituta’ in all areas of the 
polity’s life. Their brisk and prominent headings include unequivocal statements of the 
unalterably equal allocations of land made to Spartiates and the strict regulation of their 
possessions: ‘Sortium numerus idem semper maneat’; ‘Possessiones omnium sint 
aequales’; ‘Emere vel vendere possessiones non liceat’; ‘Civium numerus sortibus 
respondeat’ (‘The number of lots is always to remain the same’; ‘the possessions of all 
are to be equal’; ‘The buying and selling of possessions is not to be allowed’; ‘the 
number of citizens is to correspond to the number of lots.’ Cragius 1593: 117-9, 123). 
Sparta’s land was thus indisputably in the hands of the whole citizen body. With the 
balance of land popular and Sparta a key example of a remarkably durable republic, 
Harrington’s theory required him to characterize Sparta as a democracy – which he duly 
attempted to do, through his mouthpiece the ‘Lord Archon’ of Oceana: 
And now the riddle, which I have heretofore found troublesome to unfold, 
is out: that is to say why, Athens and Lacedaemon consisting each of the 
senate and the people, the one should be held a democracy and the other an 
aristocracy or laudable oligarchy, as it is termed by Socrates (for that word 
is not, wherever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is used also by 
Aristotle, Plutarch and others, sometimes in a good sense). The main 
difference was that the people in this had the result only, and in that the 
debate and result too. But for my part, where the people have the election of 
the senate, not bound unto a distinct order, and the result, which is the 
sovereign power, I hold them to have that share in the government (the 
senate being not for life) whereof, with the safety of the commonwealth, 
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they are capable in nature, and such a government for that cause to be 
democracy; though I do not deny but Lacedaemon, the paucity of the 
senators considered, it might be called oligarchy in comparison of Athens, 
or, if we look upon their continuance for life, though they had been more, 
aristocracy. (Harrington 1977: 263; see also 831) 
While picking through the exact differences between the ancient republics which 
rendered some of them more ‘equal’ and hence more lasting than others, Harrington’s 
fundamental impulse was to assimilate all ancient republics to each other (at least 
during the periods when they could have been said to be viable republics) and to his 
specific notion of democracy - a tendency tartly noted by Stubbe when he pointed to 
Demosthenes’ eye-witness testimony that ‘the  Governments Political of Athens and 
Sparta were not one and the same’ (1660: 12). Ancient prudence did not always 
cooperate with Harrington’s wish that it should speak with a single voice.  
Harrington was not alone in wrestling with question of Sparta’s constitutional 
form. Cragius called on the authority of Plato’s Laws in support of his view that it was 
difficult to pronounce correctly on it, and provided a discussion which drew together the 
terms and reasoning used by different ancient writers, and appropriate to different stages 
in Sparta’s constitutional development, before making his own global assessment of the 
appropriate term for Sparta’s regime (1593: 13-17). However, there clearly was a 
consensus opinion which made Athens a democracy and Sparta an aristocracy, which 
Harrington had to wrestle with and which the Lord Archon alluded to. This was 
Cragius’ ultimate conclusion too: among the succession, and sometimes mixture, of 
forms of regime at Sparta, most authors agreed that aristocracy predominated; the most 
successful phase of Sparta’s history, he judged, was as an aristocracy, and features such 
as Sparta’s use of elections based on virtue rather than sortition reinforced this 
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conclusion (1593: 13, 49). Harrington clearly had to reckon with this material, and 
indeed, his lengthy discussion of Sparta’s constitution, quoted above, drew on it directly 
(if silently) in relaying Cragius’ assertion and evidence that among the ancients 
‘oligarchy’ was not always a pejorative term (Cragius 1593: 14).  
In The Prerogative of Popular Government, Harrington revisited this question of 
constitutional terminology, pushing his analysis of the proper classification of the 
Athenian and Spartan constitutions slightly further. He admitted again that ‘Athens is 
called a democracy’ and its constitution ‘opposed unto that of Lacedaemon’ by the 
Greeks, who called Sparta an aristocracy or oligarchy. But Harrington insisted that 
‘according to my principles (if you like them)’ slightly different criteria could be used 
to determine what was ‘properly and truly to be called democracy, or popular 
government.’ He now suggested that Athens, strictly speaking, was not a democracy, 
because ‘debate in the people maketh anarchy’; Sparta, where the people (according to 
his analysis) accepted or rejected legislation but had no power of debate, was a true 
democracy. But Harrington did not expect his audience to go along with ‘my 
principles’, idiosyncratic as they were, without some ancient authority: he argued that 
‘some of the Athenians themselves’ agreed with him, and cited Isocrates’ 
Areopagiticus, where Isocrates, arguing ‘for reformation of the Athenian government’, 
described Sparta as a flourishing democracy (Harrington 1977: 479). Thus an ancient 
critic of Athenian democracy, polemically seeking to push the boundaries of the term 
away from the usual Athenian understanding of it, became a vehicle for Harrington’s 
own idiosyncratic rehabilitation of the notion of ‘democracy’.  
Harrington’s version of democracy was very particular, and Sparta served his 
purposes not just because it could be painted as a long-lasting democratic state, but 
because it offered a more reassuring model, to early modern sensibilities, than the 
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alternative of Athens. Harrington’s endorsement of democracy is enormously 
significant (Hammersley 2013; Foxley 2013a) but it does not cancel out the aristocratic 
elements in his thought noted by many previous scholars. Sparta attracted Harrington 
not just because it supported his theory of the property balance, but because it offered a 
model of a commonwealth which was in some senses aristocratic. In Oceana the Lord 
Archon rhetorically asked ‘what comparison is there of such commonwealths as are or 
come nearest to mechanic; for example, Athens, Switz, Holland, unto Lacedaemon, 
Rome, and Venice, plumed with their aristocracies?’ (Harrington 1977: 259). In 
Harrington’s scheme, there could be no such thing as a pure democracy; it would 
always be mixed with aristocracy (Harrington 1977: 174, 611). In constitutional terms, 
this was expressed in his bicameral system, in which the intellectual work of debating 
and framing legislation was entrusted to an elected senate, while the popular 
representative assembly would simply judge whether their interests were served by the 
senate’s proposals and vote yes or no accordingly – Harrington enthusiastically 
endorsed Sparta’s reported prohibition on popular debate. This bicameral structure 
reflected a more fundamental natural division. Harrington argued that there was a 
‘natural aristocracy’ of intellect which would distinguish itself in any society, and in 
Oceana the process of popular election would help to winnow out this aristocratic 
element from the ‘natural democracy’ of the less able (1977: 172-3; 416). In addition, 
the Senate of Oceana had a property qualification for membership, meaning that 
however strenuously Harrington objected to separate, hereditary orders of nobility as 
divisive, he insisted on two rather ‘aristocratic’ principles on which to divide the 
citizens of his equal commonwealth. This division, essential to Harrington’s thought 
throughout his brief career as a political writer, did not seem to him to contradict his 
overall classification of his ideal polity as a democracy.  
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We have seen how Harrington juggled with the terminology of constitutions as 
applied to both Sparta and Athens, but his argument depended not just on adopting the 
unusual terminology used by some ancient texts (and reported by Cragius), but on 
interpreting Spartan history. Although authors ancient and early modern were tempted 
to make overall pronouncements on Sparta’s constitution, all conceded that the question 
was time-bound, and had to identify particular periods in Sparta’s history as salient. 
Stubbe indeed pointed out that some of the sparse evidence for Sparta as a ‘democracy’ 
dated from after the Peloponnesian War, and thus could not logically be used in support 
of Harrington’s argument, which dated the debasement of the original Spartan regime 
from that point (1659b: 5). Harrington’s argument, however, rested on the notion that a 
commonwealth with the right balance and the right orders could be immortal; Sparta 
and Venice were models because they seemed to have approached this ideal according 
to mythologising accounts of their longevity. Harrington did not believe that chance or 
the incremental workings of a non-ideal political system were likely to produce the 
carefully engineered commonwealth which could achieve such longevity: rather, it 
would be the product of a far-sighted founder who could put the whole system in place 
at once. Lycurgus exemplified this ideal: the short concluding section of Oceana 
borrowed from Plutarch’s Lycurgus the story of how Lycurgus immortalised his orders 
at Sparta by sacrificing his life so that the Spartans were eternally bound to their 
promise not to change the laws until he returned to them (Harrington 1977: 341). In 
Harrington’s text, as in Plutarch’s, the acknowledgement of change after Lycurgus’ time 
was present within the text but elided in a triumphal conclusion.  
Harrington thus had to argue for a fundamental stability of the constitution from 
Lycurgus’ time, and this constitution needed to approach as closely as possible to 
democracy. Harrington achieved this by reading carefully selected parts of the ancient 
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evidence in Cragius through a distinctively modern argument: Bodin’s theory of 
indivisible sovereignty. Polybius had seen Sparta as the exemplar of a mixed polity, but 
although Harrington paid lip service to the notion of the mixed constitution (1977: 162) 
he wanted to call his ideal constitution, even if it had elements of mixture, a democracy. 
In this, he followed Bodin, who had elaborated a theory of indivisible sovereignty 
according to which even apparently mixed states could be classified simply according to 
where sovereignty lay. An apparent mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy 
would in fact be a democracy, since in it all the people would share in the sovereignty 
(Bodin 1586: 176). Bodin’s theory became associated with monarchist and absolutist 
positions, but Harrington attacked Hobbes and his deployment of Bodin while himself 
using the Bodinian criterion of popular sovereignty to characterize both Oceana and 
Sparta as democratic.  
The core of the Spartan constitution, in Harrington’s reading, was the balanced, 
bicameral combination of a popular assembly with a senate (the gerousia). Lycurgus 
was the accepted author of these elements of the constitution, but Cragius reported a 
consensus that Lycurgus had set up an aristocracy. Bodin, more helpfully, saw the 
original Lycurgan constitution as a democracy (‘popularem statum’); Lycurgus had 
given ‘imperium’ and ‘maiestas’ to the people themselves, as they were able to confirm 
or reject the senate’s proposals. Only later had the state become aristocratic (Bodin 
1586: 177-8). Other sources (Isocrates and Aristotle) which made Sparta a democracy 
referred to the period after the institution of the ephors rather than to the original 
Lycurgan dispensation (Cragius 1593: 14-15). Harrington’s task was to combine these 
two views: Lycurgus set up a democracy (in which the popular assembly had the final 
determination of legislation and the people elected the senate and the magistrates), and 
it was continued once the ephors were in place. In his interpretation, there was only the 
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briefest interlude between the senate’s attempt to override popular decisions on 
legislation (as mandated by the Great Rhetra recorded in Plutarch’s Lycurgus) and the 
restoration of popular sovereignty under the ephors – both events taking place, as 
Plutarch suggested, in the reign of Theopompus, about 130 years after the time of 
Lycurgus (Plutarch 2005: 9-10). 
Harrington had to make one very awkward move in order to paint Sparta as a 
democracy, but it seems to have been one he was relatively comfortable with. As with 
other early modern authors, he may routinely have assumed that citizenship had 
boundaries, beyond which the remainder of the population – in the case of Harrington’s 
Oceana, this was made up of ‘servants’ who by definition lacked the means to ‘live of 
themselves’ – were barely considered as constituting part of the polity when its political 
arrangements were considered. As he briskly remarked, the exclusion of servants from 
citizenship ‘needeth no proof’ as ‘servitude... is inconsistent with freedom or 
participation of government in a commonwealth’ (Harrington 1977: 212). Sparta, like 
Venice, presented the problem of a commonwealth whose tiny citizen body was out of 
all proportion to its actual population. Harrington acknowledged that in a 
‘commonwealth for increase’ this would be problematic, but in these two small 
commonwealths which were only attempting to maintain themselves rather than grow, 
the small citizen body had the great advantage that it could – by an odd and very 
Harringtonian sleight of hand – both be exemplarily equal and democratic, and be noble 
and aristocratic. To have a citizen body divided into hereditary orders would be fatal to 
the ‘equality’ of a commonwealth, causing dissension, but Harrington relished the 
paradoxical notion of a commonwealth in which the entire citizenry was noble 
(Harrington 1977: 260-1, 426-7, 438).  
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The dispute with Stubbe 
 
In the republican debates of 1659, Harrington’s writings offered by far the most 
developed, ready-made constitutional proposals which were available: many of the 
republicans of the 1650s had paid scant attention to constitutional prescription, or had 
addressed it only in the most general terms. But the urgent need in 1659 to find a stable 
non-monarchical settlement which could resist attempts at restoration or king-making 
made some fear that Harrington’s ideal was impracticable or even positively dangerous. 
Conversely, Harrington feared the implications of rival republican proposals which 
were either unicameral (with a council ruling in the intervals between sittings) or 
demanded, as the army had in May, a ‘select Senate’ or even ‘ephors’ set over the 
popular house (The Humble Petition, 1659: 10-11; Ludlow 1894: II, 99; Nippel 1994: 
22-24). Harrington’s response to such proposals, in his pamphlets of May 1659, was to 
focus on the danger of an ‘oligarchy’ snatching away the possibility of any 
commonwealth, as well as on the imperfections which might render a commonwealth 
not ‘equal’ (Harrington 1977: 730, 736-7, 739, 745). Although he distinguished between 
oligarchy – as something which could prevent a commonwealth being settled at all – 
and a senate for life or optimacy, which would prevent it being an ‘equal’ 
commonwealth, Harrington pointed out that an oligarchy ‘may consist of a council not 
elected by the people, but obtruded upon us under the notion of a senate’ (Harrington 
1977: 730). An elected senate, even if for life (as at Sparta), was at least consistent with 
a commonwealth; but the army proposal, backed by Stubbe, was for a select, not elected 
senate.  
In the preface to his Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause in September 1659, 
Stubbe defended his version of the republican cause on two fronts: against Richard 
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Baxter’s Holy Commonwealth and against the Harringtonian accusation of oligarchy. 
Professing his admiration of Harrington, he nonetheless argued that there was nothing 
wrong with an ‘unequal’ commonwealth, and that the coordinate senate he supported, 
rather than becoming an ‘oligarchy’, could be an essential foundational period of rule 
comparable to that of Lycurgus or Moses – the lawgivers most admired by Harrington. 
That some of Stubbe’s professed admiration for Harrington was real is suggested by the 
fact that while he disputed his interpretation of ‘oligarchy’, he actively utilised a 
positive, Harringtonian, interpretation of ‘democracy’ in arguing against the 
conventionally anti-democratic Baxter (Stubbe, 1659a: Preface, unpaginated). Stubbe 
was thus already thoroughly engaged in a public conversation with Harrington about the 
meaning and applicability of the classical constitutional terminology, but it was a month 
later, in October, that he joined battle with Harrington directly over the interpretation of 
Sparta, and began both to hint at the possible reclamation not just of the select 
coordinate senate from the accusation of oligarchy, but also at the reclamation of 
‘oligarchy’ itself from its pejorative overtones. In his Letter to an Officer of the Army 
concerning a Select Senate, Stubbe again defended the proposal for a select senate 
against charges of oligarchy, but felt compelled to add a marginal note:  
I take Oligarchy here, as the ignorant Vulgar mistake it; for the corruption 
of Aristocracy; whereas Oligarchy is but the Government of a few, and not 
of the Body: And it is observed by Crag. upon the Spartan Republick, that 
Oligarchy is a word of an Innocent, yea, a good signification; and the 
Reiglement of Lacedaemon is called an Oligarchy by Isocrates, and others; 
though he who shall examine the institution of the Senate will say it was 
made up of the best, and so was an Aristocracy. (Stubbe 1659b: 2-3) 
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As well as following Cragius’ comment (also relayed by Harrington), Stubbe here 
insisted on a value-neutral etymological reading of the meaning of oligarchy, and from 
the Isocratean verdicts reported by Cragius, Stubbe chose to highlight his reference to 
Sparta as an oligarchy where Harrington had used his description of it as a democracy. 
However in the main text of his work, Stubbe developed the argument not that Sparta 
was an oligarchy but that it was an ‘Aristocracy’ or an ‘Optimacy’. He framed his 
argument in unmistakeably Harringtonian terms, precisely in order to overturn the 
implications of Harrington’s arguments. He agreed with Harrington that Lycurgus had 
initially established ‘an equal Common-wealth... in a Senate proposing, and people 
resolving’; what is more, he did so in far more advantageous conditions than applied in 
England in 1659. However, this state (which Stubbe does not specifically describe as 
democratic or popular, but which the Harringtonian language would imply was so) did 
not last, as the Spartans after only ‘100, or 130 years’ decided that ‘they preferred an 
Aristocracy’ (Stubbe 1659b: 4-5). He contrasted this with ‘the popular constitution of 
Athens’ and emphasized the ideological aspect of the struggle between Athens and 
Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (Stubbe 1659b: 5). But he did not paint Sparta as an 
oligarchy or defend oligarchy as such.  
Stubbe took that step only after his Letter to an Officer of the Army had met with 
a slight and dismissive response from Harrington, insultingly entitled ‘A Sufficient 
Answer to Mr Stubbe’, appended to Harrington’s Valerius and Publicola of October-
November 1659. Largely ignoring the more detailed discussion within Stubbe’s 
pamphlet, Harrington objected to the way in which Stubbe had flipped round 
Harringtonian ideas to reach opposite conclusions, and characterized the result as ‘the 
lively emblem of an oligarchy’ (Harrington 1977: 804-5). Stubbe’s positive insistence 
that an ‘unequal’ commonwealth might be the preferable option for England, and 
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perhaps his advocacy of a fairly detailed scheme of elections and powers which had a 
Harringtonian feel but ignored Harringtonian principles, might understandably have 
riled him (Stubbe 1659b: 57, 62-3). At any rate, his dismissive response, perhaps 
combined with changed political circumstances, liberated Stubbe to move one stage 
further in his argument in his final challenge to Harrington, The Common-Wealth of 
Oceana Put into the Ballance, and found too light. Or An Account of the Republick of 
Sparta, probably published after the return of the excluded members to the Rump 
parliament had made restoration inevitable. Here Stubbe offered an account of the 
development of Sparta’s constitution, ostentatiously laced with passages from the 
sources in the original Greek, and including corrections on minor points of scholarly 
disagreement, which in essentials repeated what he had argued the previous autumn: the 
‘Oceanistical Platform’ on which Lycurgus founded Sparta lasted no longer than 130 
years, and was replaced by a constitution in which the senate could overrule the people. 
It was this undemocratic model which Sparta then exported to her allies. The difference, 
in Stubbe’s final account, is that he now insisted that the Spartans called their regime 
‘an Oligarchy, and Aristocracy, (but the former name, I think, is more usual)’. Stubbe 
consistently described Sparta as an oligarchy here, cherrypicking the sources to enable 
him to do so (1660: 11). Not satisfied with this, Stubbe went further, suggesting in his 
preface that until the time of Pericles, the powers of the Areopagus made even Athens 
‘almost an Aristocracy (as Sigonius confesseth)’ (1660: ‘To the Reader’, unpaginated). 
Although he accepted that Athens then became a democracy, he used this conclusion to 
argue that ‘by how much the Spartans are of more repute than the Athenians, and their 
republick more celebrated, so far Oligarchy is advanced above Democracy’ (Stubbe 
1660: 14).  
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Stubbe’s logic in defining constitutions was mixed: while he drew on etymology 
and on ancient descriptions of the constitutions of Athens and Sparta, further arguments 
were apparent. He suggested that Harrington was failing to follow the principles of 
ancient nomenclature in saying ‘that where the over-ballance of land & power was in a 
few, it was Aristocracy, though Aristotle do constantly avow it to be Oligarchy’ (Stubbe 
1660: ‘To the Reader’, unpaginated). In Harrington’s Valerius and Publicola the 
government of a few was said not to be an aristocracy ‘where there is not a nobility 
sufficiently balanced or enriched’, but only an oligarchy (Harrington 1977: 785). While 
in theory Harrington had clung on to the ancient ethical requirements of good 
government, his account of the distinction between the original and the degenerate 
simple forms of government hinged on the fit between the property balance and the 
political regime as well as on the directly ethical criteria suggested by ancient authors: 
in the degenerate forms of government, power did not rest on the property balance, and 
hence could not be maintained without violence (Harrington 1977: 164; Foxley 2013: 
187-8). Thus, as Nelson points out, Harrington at one point mistranslates Aristotle, 
conflating virtue with eminence in property-holding – which, as Stubbe noted, were 
very much distinct in Aristotle’s thinking (Nelson 2004: 111). In effect, Stubbe hinted, 
Harrington was abandoning the ancient principles of ethical politics which he claimed 
to espouse. 
In general, however, Stubbe defined polities in exactly the same way as 
Harrington: through Bodin’s criterion of sovereignty. In the case of Sparta, this required 
an examination of who had the final power of legislation after the reign of Theopompus 
and Polydorus – since Stubbe and Harrington were prepared to agree that the Lycurgan 
system put in place about 130 years earlier was popular. Cragius offered grist for both 
their mills, in separate accounts of the power of the people, the senate, and the ephors 
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which tended to generalise about the Spartan constitution rather than pin it down to a 
particular phase of its history, but which also pulled in different directions on the 
question of sovereignty. In Plutarch’s account, the institution of the ephors fell in 
Theopompus’ reign, along with the newly acquired ability of the senate to overrule the 
people’s legislative decisions. For Harrington, the ephors were a rapid and effective 
popular response to this infringement of the people’s legislative sovereignty. Cragius 
helpfully claimed that the people’s power in their assemblies was restored under the 
ephors (1593: 32); as Stubbe pointed out, warrant for this belief was hard to find in the 
ancient sources, which framed the powers of the ephors in rather different terms, and 
not in terms of involvement in legislative decisions (Stubbe 1659b: 5; Stubbe 1660: 13). 
Nonetheless, Harrington followed Cragius, and elaborated on the powers over the kings 
and senators which the ancient sources did give to the ephors, arguing that these powers 
were used if kings and senators went about ‘to subvert the fundamental laws of their 
government, by which it belonged unto the senate to debate and propose only, and to the 
people to resolve’ (Harrington 1977: 731). Thus popular sovereignty, through the 
people’s electoral and legislative power, was secure. 
For Stubbe, by contrast, the criterion of sovereignty gave a clear verdict in 
favour of oligarchy, not democracy, at Sparta, and he emphasized that he was applying 
this criterion even more single-mindedly than Harrington, who muddied the waters by 
discussing the presence or absence of ‘equality’ within a (democratic) commonwealth 
on criteria such as rotation of office: 
The power of the Athenian people is opposed to that of the Spartan Senate; 
and not the defect of rotation in one Senate above the other; nor the power 
of debating in the Democracy of Athens, which wanted in Sparta: but the 
final result is fixed in the Spartan Senate.  
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In short, the only significant difference was ‘that in Athens the PEOPLE had the 
SOVERAIGNTY, & in Sparta the SENATE. It is therefore apparent that Lacedaemon 
was no Oceanistical Republique, but an Oligarchy’ (Stubbe 1660: 12-13). Cragius’ 
chapter on the senate gave ample grounds for such a view, emphasizing the supreme 
power of the senate and citing, as Stubbe did, Demosthenes’ argument that a Spartan 
elected senator immediately became ‘MASTER over the people’ (Cragius 1593: 70-71; 
Stubbe 1660: 12). Cragius qualified this claim by suggesting that the senate’s original 
power was curbed by the institution of the ephors, but did not explain how 
Demosthenes’ evidence for the fourth century tallied with this. A reader could easily 
draw Stubbe’s conclusions from the overall emphasis of this chapter, just as they could 
draw Harrington’s conclusions from the emphasis of the chapter on the popular 
assembly. But Cragius’ discussion of the institution of the senate not only supported his 
overall description of Sparta as an aristocracy, but went out of its way to endow the 
senate with a role not just in restraining the power of the kings (as Plato’s Laws argued) 
but in checking the danger of ‘plebis dominatio’: for Cragius, Plato’s one-sided version 
needed to be interpreted by Plutarch’s deliberately balanced account, which he quoted at 
length (Cragius 1593: 69-70). For Cragius, the Spartan senate specifically averted the 
threat of popular rule. Stubbe’s further interpretation of the evidence, in favour of 
oligarchy rather than aristocracy, was a presumably a back-handed tribute to 
Harrington’s own vocabulary: he was not only prepared to defend what Harrington 
condemned as oligarchy, but to defend it under that name.  
Along with the location of sovereignty, the other crucial factor in classifying 
Sparta’s constitution was the question of the inclusion and exclusion of its residents 
from the bounds of citizenship. Harrington, as we have seen, airily dismissed the 
significance of the non-free population of Sparta, allowing him to claim Sparta as a 
25 
 
near-democracy and an example of equality – perhaps the aristocratic ‘equality’ of the 
‘homoioi’. This position was not without its strains for Harrington, especially when it 
came to the debates of 1659-60. Against Stubbe’s proposals not only to institute a select 
senate, but also to distinguish the loyal ‘people’, as citizens, from the broader ‘nation’, 
Harrington retorted ‘that he [Stubbe] would have all the rest of the people of England to 
be helots’ (1977: 804). Stubbe had himself invited this comparison, explicitly tackling 
the question of how the ‘people’ (the citizen body) should be defined and arguing – in 
ways that were certainly directed against Harrington as well as against aspects of 
received opinion (Jacob 1983: 29) – that owning or working land in a particular place 
was neither ‘necessary’ nor ‘sufficient’ for citizenship there. Both these points he 
attempted to prove by reference to Sparta, in the first case without elaboration, but in 
the second with two specific arguments. Those who held or worked land in Laconia 
might not be Spartan citizens for two different reasons. Firstly, ‘The Helots were not the 
people of Lacedemon, though they were the Boores and pesantry thereof, renting the 
whole Countrey, and infinitely more in number than the Lacedemonians’. Secondly, 
according to Xenophon, Spartan citizens who failed to comply with the ‘fundamental 
discipline’ required of them could be deprived of their citizen status without losing their 
allocations of land (Stubbe 1659b: 52). Harrington and Stubbe both pointed to the 
helots’ non-citizen status within the Spartan commonwealth, but for opposing reasons. 
Harrington wanted to show that Sparta was a model for a democratic commonwealth in 
England (by showing that ‘internally’ it was ‘equal’); Stubbe that it was a model for an 
exclusive commonwealth (in that the majority of its residents were not citizens). For 
Stubbe, however, emphasizing the numbers and offering a notably positive gloss on the 
status of the helots (as a kind of tenant farmers rather than slaves) allowed him to paint 
a picture of a society that constituted a broader ‘nation’ in England, but which would be 
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ruled (at least temporarily) by a much smaller group of full citizens. For Harrington, 
minimizing the importance of the helots by putting them outside the boundary of the 
Spartan polity itself – so that they were merely an ‘external’ problem – meant that 
Stubbe’s comparison of the bulk of the English people to the helots was a cause for 
outrage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both the ancient authors and early modern scholarship offered a matrix of criteria for 
constitutional definitions, and a spectrum of possible classifications for Sparta, with 
‘aristocracy’ or some form of mixed government the consensus position. It was not 
possible to ignore these materials, but both Harrington and Stubbe exploited the 
inconsistencies and instabilities of ancient texts and early modern interpretations of 
them to make arguments which pushed against the boundaries of both ancient and early 
modern consensus: Harrington in making Sparta a democracy; Stubbe in positively 
advocating oligarchy. Both also sought to question Athens’s reputation as simply a 
democracy. Harrington’s arguments demonstrate that early modern readers did not 
necessarily take Athens as the central or best exemplar even of ‘democracy’, while 
Stubbe’s ripostes suggest that even where Sparta was seen as exemplifying ‘oligarchy’ 
this did not rule it out as a valid model. Although the constitutional labels attached to 
the preeminent ancient polities were broadly agreed, at this tipping-point in the English 
Revolution the imperatives of contemporary politics prevailed over the scholarly 
consensus. 
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